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I INTRODUCTION 
The recent Auckland power crisis did not merely provide the rest of the country with 
a rare opportunity to have a guilty laugh at Auckland's expense. It also provided a 
perfect chance to re-examine the law governing the recovery of negligently inflicted 
economic loss. Indeed, because of the large financial losses they tend to cause, power 
failures have contributed significantly to this area of law. 1 Thus from a strictly 
academic point of view, Mercury Energy's commitment to settling claims is rather 
unfortunate. 2 
The basic problem which economic loss poses for negligence law is familiar. The net 
of liability thrown by Lord Atkin in Donoghue v Stevenson3 is, of itself, far too wide 
to avoid the oft-mentioned spectre of "liability in an indeterminate amount for an 
indeterminate time to an indeterminate class".4 Various control mechanisms have had 
to be used in addition to reasonable foreseeability to keep potential liability within 
realistic boundaries. 5 In particular, a reluctance to allow the recovery of "pure" 
economic loss, that is "loss suffered by an individual that is not accompanied by 
physical or property damage",6 has been one of these mechanisms.7 
1 See Seaway Hotels Ltd v Gragg (Canada) Ltd and Consumer Gas Co (1959) 17 DLR (2d) 292; 
Dominion Tape of Canada Ltdv LR McDonald & Sons Ltd [1971] 3 OR 627 and Heeney v Best (1979) 
28 OR (2d) 71 from Canada; SCM (UK) Ltd v WJ Whittall & Son Ltd (1971] I QB 337 and Spartan 
Steel & Alloys Ltd v Martin & Co Contractors Ltd [1973] 1 QB 27 from England; and NZ Forest 
Products v A-G (1986] 1 NZLR 76 and Mainguard Packaging Ltd v Hilton Haulage Ltd [1990] 1 
NZLR 360 from New Zealand. 
2 Mercury Energy announced its "fast-track" compensation scheme on 19 March 1998: "Mercury 
Energy offer funded by $20m payout", National Business Review, New Zealand, 27 March 1998, I. 
But see "Firms set to give Mercury a jolt", Sunday Star-Times, New Zealand, 17 May 1998, A3; and 
"Legal aid for business broken by power crisis", Sunday Star-Times, New Zealand, 14 June 1998, AS 
which indicate that a class action is still being contemplated. 
3 (1932] AC 562. 
4 Ultramares Corporation v Touche (1931) 174 NE 441 , 444 per Cardozo J. 
5 This point is made famously by Lord GofFs observation in Smith v Littlewoods Organisation Ltd 
[ 1987] I AC 241 , 280 that "nowadays ... the function of the duty of care is not so much to identify cases 
where liability is imposed as to identify those where it is not" [Smith v Littlewoods]. 
6 D 'Amato v Badger (1996) 137 DLR (4th) 129, 133 (SCC). 
7 Although Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller & Partners (1964] 2 AC 465 removed the absolute bar on 
claims for pure economic loss, the reluctance to allow its recovery has remained in various forms of 
rigidity. Compare the bright-line exclusionary rule in Murphy v Brentwood District Council [ 1991] AC 
398 [Murphy] with the more flexible attitude of the New Zealand Courts which regard economic loss 
as simply a factor telling against a duty of care: South Pacific Manufacturing v New Zealand Security 
Consultants [ 1992] 2 NZLR 282 [South Pacific]. 
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The premise underlying all economic loss cases is that some plaintiffs must miss out. 
Although the amount of economic loss caused in a particular case may well be 
determinate, a decision to allow recovery for that type of loss can create huge 
potential liability. The problem is conceptual, rather than factual, indeterminacy. The 
question is how to draw the line in a principled way. 
Recently, this question has been asked with renewed vigour in the context of a 
particular type of pure economic loss known as 'contractual relational economic loss'. 
Relational economic loss occurs when a plaintiff suffers economic loss as a 
"consequence of a physical injury to a third party or damage to the third party's 
property" but where neither the plaintiff, nor his or her property, has been damaged. 8 
Contractual relational economic loss occurs when the damage affects a contractual 
right held by the plaintiff. An example of such loss from the Auckland power crisis 
would be the lost profits of a catering company unable to provide food at a function 
because its supplier's unrefrigerated stocks had spoilt. 
This paper is concerned with when contractual relational economic loss is and should 
be recoverable in New Zealand. 
What makes this such an interesting topic is that it is currently a major battleground of 
modern negligence law. Traditionally, the recoverability of this type of loss has been 
framed as a decision about whether a certain old legal rule should apply. Recent 
cases, however, have injected this rule with modern analysis. These cases have 
recognised that contractual relational economic loss is, in many ways, a marker for all 
economic loss. This is because - being so commonly caused - contractual relational 
economic loss raises the fundamental indeterminacy problem in acute form . 
• 
The result is that contractual relational economic loss has been revisited, but with a 
far broader focus. The focus has moved from precedent to approach. The question 
of when this type of loss should be recoverable has turned into a debate over the very 
concepts which control negligence liability. 
8 Robby Bernstein Economic Loss (Longman, London, 1993) 131. 
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This paper is divided into three parts. Part II will examine the current legal position 
in New Zealand with reference to inherited English precedent. It concludes that New 
Zealand law is unclear as the cases reveal two conflicting lines of authority. Part III 
will discuss the approaches of Australia and Canada with particular emphasis on the 
sophisticated Canadian jurisprudence. Part IV will analyse these approaches and then 
suggest the direction this author considers New Zealand law should take. It concludes 
that not only should New Zealand courts reaffirm the old rule, but that doing so now 
requires a radical rethink of the basic New Zealand approach to negligence law. 
II THE NEW ZEALAND POSITION 
A The Prima Facie Position 
At first glance, the question of when contractual relational economic loss is 
recoverable may seem easy to answer. The Court of Appeal in the cases of Brown v 
Heathcote County Counciz9 and South Pacific Manufacturing Co Ltd v New Zealand 
Security Consultants & Investigations Ltd10 has directly addressed the issue of when a 
duty of care should be held to exist. Both cases essentially affirm the two-step 
approach in Anns v Merton Borough Counci/ 11 and emphasise that the critical decision 
of whether to allow recovery is always a policy one based on "whether it is just and 
reasonable to uphold a duty of particular scope". 12 This is a question of "mixed law 
and fact" 13 which requires consideration of a wide range of different factors. 14 
Negligence law is therefore governed by policy and not by hard and fast rules. 
Accordingly, Cooke P in particular has made it clear that "the fact that economic loss 
rather than personal physical injury has been suffered may weigh against a duty of 
care, but is certainly not decisive per se". 15 Thus contractual relational economic loss 
9 [1986] I NZLR 76 [Brown] 
10 South Pacific above n7. 
11 [1978] AC 728, 751-752 [Anns]. See Brown above n9, 78 per Cooke P; and South Pacific above n7, 
295-297 per Cooke P and 305 per Richardson J. 
12 South Pacific above n7, 297 per Cooke P. 
13 South Pacific above n7, 290 per Cooke P. 
14 South Pacific above n7, 290-299 per Cooke P. 
15 South Pacific above n7, 296 per Cooke P. See also Brown above n9, 78 per Cooke P: "We have also 
recognised that, if the loss in question is merely economic, that may tell against a duty" . 
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would appear to be recoverable when justified on policy grounds, and irrecoverable 
when not. 
There is High Court support for this approach. Two High Court cases, both involving 
claims for relational economic loss caused by interruptions to a power supply, 
allowed recovery. The first is New Zealand Forest Products Ltd v Attorney-
General.16 In this case Post Office workers accidentally cut through an electricity 
cable which was owned by the Thames Valley Electric Power Board, but supplied 
electricity solely to the plaintiffs mill. No damage was caused to the plaintiffs 
property, but the plaintiff lost money through the mill being out of production. 
Barker J had little hesitation in rejecting the majority decision from the English Court 
of Appeal case of Spartan Steel & Alloys Ltd v Martin & Co (Contractors) Ltd. 17 
This case, in very similar circumstances, allowed the plaintiff to recover for economic 
loss consequent on physical damage it suffered but not for pure economic loss 
sustained by being out of production. Barker J regarded this distinction ~s being 
"without logic" 18 and allowed recovery as the plaintiffs economic loss was 
reasonably foreseeable to the defendant. 
In the second case, Mainguard Packaging v Hilton Haulage, 19 the defendant transport 
company reversed into a power pole supplying electricity to the plaintiff factory. This 
caused a power surge closely followed by a power cut. The former started a fire in 
the plaintiffs sales office and the latter kept the plaintiffs factory out of action for 24 
hours. It was accepted that this latter loss was not consequent on any physical 
damage. Tipping J found that Hilton owed a duty to Mainguard and that both types of 
loss flowed directly from Hilton's breach of this duty. His Honour therefore allowed 
recovery. Again, although contractual relational economic loss was sustained, his 
Honour did not regard this fact as significant. 20 
16 [1986] 1 NZLR 14 [New Zealand Forests]. 
17 [1973] I QB 27 [Spartan Steel] . 
18 New Zealand Forests above nl6, 17. 
19 [1990] I NZLR 360 [Mainguard]. 
20 Despite Tipping J's treatment of the case as identical to New Zealand Forests, it is less strong 
because Mainguard did suffer physical damage. Thus it is possible (although difficult) to view it not as 
a relational loss case, but as a consequential loss case which adopts a wider rule for recovery than that 
applied in Spartan Steel. This would make it similar to the Ontario Court of Appeal decision in 
Seaway Hotels Ltd v Gragg (Canada) Ltd and Consumers' Gas Co (1959) 17 DLR (2d) 292 where a 
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B The Exclusionary Rule 
The law is, however, not as simple as these cases make it appear. The reason for this 
is a long line of authority beginning around 187 5. The classic starting point is Cattle 
v The Stockton Waterworks Co21 involving a plaintiff who had contracted to build a 
tunnel on a third party's land. Due to the negligence of the defendant, the tunnel 
flooded and this put the plaintiff to extra expense. Blackburn J dismissed the 
plaintiffs action on the basis that a mere contractual interest in damaged property 
does not give a right to sue for its damage. 
This principle has been consistently affirmed over time. 22 Through later cases it has 
hardened into an exclusionary rule that in order to sue for damage to property, a 
plaintiff must have either a possessory23 or a legal proprietary interest in the property. 
The rule thus specifically precludes contractual relational economic loss and is 
therefore inconsistent with the result in the New Zealand Forests case and erobably 
the Mainguard case also.24 
Importantly, far from being a legal anachronism dated by the complexity of modem 
negligence law, the exclusionary rule has been directly affirmed twice in the last 15 
years by the Privy Council and the House of Lords respectively. 
hotel, due to severed power cables, suffered lost profits as well as damage to food which spoilt. The 
fact of physical damage was "was the hook upon which liability was hung for the entire loss": Hon 
Allen Linden Canadian Tort Law (5ed, Carswell, Toronto, 1993) 385. Italics in original. 
21 (1875) LR 10 QB 453 [Cattle]. 
22 See Simpson & Co v Thompson (1877) 2 App Cas 279; La Societe de Ramorquage a He/ice v 
Bennetts [1911] 1 KB 243; Elliot Steam Tug Co Ltd v Shipping Controller [1922] I KB 127; Weller & 
Co v Foot and Mouth Disease Research Institute [1966] I QB 569; and Margarine Union GmbH v 
Cam bay Prince Steamship Co Ltd (The Wear Breeze) [ 1969] I QB 219. 
23 Possession is a fairly ill-defined common law concept. Legal possession is more than merely 
possession in fact. The "intention with which that possession is exercised needs to be considered as 
well": Robby Bernstein Economic Loss above n8, 135. Further, it is unclear whether actual possession 
is required by this rule, or whether a "right to possession" is sufficient. The following cases have 
tentatively indicated the latter: Chabbra Corporation Pte Ltd v Jag Shakti [ 1986] AC 377 and 
Transcontainer Express Ltd v Custodian Security Ltd [1988] 1 Lloyd's Rep 128. 
24 This rule should not be confused with the broad exclusionary rule laid down by the House of Lords 
in Murphy v Brentwood District Council (above n7) which, subject to limited exceptions such as 
Hedley Byrne, disallowed all claims for pure economic loss. This broad rule is certainly not a part of 
New Zealand law: Jnvercargill City Council v Hamlin [1996] I NZLR 513. However, as La Forest J 
noted in Canadian National Railways v Norsk Pacific Steamship Co ( 1992) 91 DLR ( 4th) 289, 308: 
"the precedents support a distinct approach to the issue of contractual relational economic loss." All 
references to "the exclusionary rule" in this paper are to the narrow rule laid down in Cattle. 
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Both cases involve rather complicated facts. Candlewood Navigation Corporation 
Ltd v Mitsui OSK Lines Ltd (I'he Mineral Transporter / 5 was decided in 1986 by the 
Privy Council. The first plaintiff in this case was the owner of a vessel named the 
Ibaraki Maru and let her to the second plaintiff by a demise charter. The second 
plaintiff then let the Jbaraki Maru back to the first plaintiff by a time charter. The 
vessel was damaged when another vessel negligently collided with her. Both 
plaintiffs claimed damages. The second plaintiff was liable under its contract with the 
owner (who was of course the first plaintiff) to repair the ship. It recovered this loss 
from the defendant. Whilst under repair, the first plaintiff was liable to pay a reduced 
hire rate but could not use the Jbaraki Maru during this time. It sued for both the 
wasted hire cost and its lost profits.26 
The Committee denied the first plaintiffs claims and upheld the exclusionary rule. 
Lord Fraser adopted the classic statement of the rule given by Scrutton LJ in Elliot 
Steam Tug Co Ltd v Shipping Controller:27 
At common law there is no doubt about the position. In case of a wrong 
done to a chattel the common law does not recognise a person whose 
rights are a contractual right to have the use or services of a chattel for 
purposes of making profits or gains without possession or property in 
the chattel. 
As a time charter gave only a contractual and neither a possessory or proprietary right 
to use the Jbaraki Maru, the first plaintiff had no standing to sue.28 
25 
[ 1986] I AC I [The Mineral Transporter] . 
26 It was accepted that although the first plaintiff was the owner, its only claim was in its capacity as 
time charterer. This is because its loss was that the time charter was less profitable than it otherwise 
would have been. It did not suffer any loss as owner of the ship. 
27 [1922] I KB 127, 139. Cited in The Mineral Transporter above n25 , 15. See also 25 of the same 
case. 
28 The reason that the plaintiff did not have a possessory interest, even though it was using the boat, 
was because of a technicality of maritime law. It is established that only a demise charter gives a 
possessory interest. The major difference between a time charter and a demise charter is that, under the 
latter, the master and the crew become employees of the charterer. The former simply gives the 
charterer a contractual right to their services. See Bernstein Economic Loss above n8, 135; and above 
n23 generally. 
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The House of Lords emphatically reaffirmed this decision less than a year later in 
another maritime case, Leigh and Sullivan v Aliakmon Ltd (J'he Aliakmon).29 The 
damage in this case was to cargo negligently carried in the defendant's ship. The 
plaintiff was the buyer of this cargo under an unusual c.i.f. agreement. Usually such a 
contract provides for the risk in the goods to pass to the buyer upon shipment and for 
property to pass when the buyer collects the shipping documents, including the bill of 
lading. By statute, where property passed through the seller's endorsement of the bill 
of lading, acquisition of this document gave the buyer full rights to sue under the 
seller's original contract of carriage.30 This would have given the plaintiff the right to 
sue for the damage to the cargo. 
However, due to the plaintiffs difficulties in paying for the goods the agreement was 
importantly varied. The seller reserved title in the goods until payment. This 
prevented property from passing through the seller's endorsement of the bill of lading 
together with its concomitant rights of suit. The unfortunate effect of this was that at 
the time of damage, the plaintiff had the risk but not the legal property in th~ goods. 
Thus, although the owner of the goods had a right to sue, only the plaintiff had 
suffered loss. Despite this, the Board held that the plaintiff had no cause of action. 
The Board stated that even if the plaintiff had an equitable interest in the goods, such 
an interest is insufficient to give title to sue. 31 
C The Exclusionary Rule in New Zealand 
The exclusionary rule, far from having decayed in unread law reports, is alive and 
well. What is more is that there are indications it does apply in New Zealand. Firstly, 
it was applied in the High Court decision of Seddon v Ryans Carriers Ltd.32 In this 
case the plaintiff sued to recover for damage caused to her garden by a truck which 
crashed into it. What made this case interesting is that the garden was not actually the 
plaintiffs property, but part of the Wellington Town Belt. The case proceeded upon 
29 [1986] AC 785 [The Aliakmon] 
30 Bill of Lading Act 1855 (UK), 18 & 19 Vic, c 111 , s 1. 
31 The Aliakmon above n29, 813 . Incidentally, in response to the perceived injustice of this decision 
s 2(1) of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1992 (UK) - the successor to the Bills of Lading Act 1855 -
was enacted to give the rights of suit to all holders of the bill of lading, irrespective of whether or not 
property passed through endorsement of the bill. 
32 (3 February 1995) unreported, High Court, Wellington Registry, CP 82/91 , Gallen J. 
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the assumption that due to Cattle and The Aliakmon either legal title or possession had 
to be established to enable the plaintiff to sue. 33 
Secondly, the exclusionary rule has been referred to on more than one occasion by the 
Court of Appeal. In Williams v Attorney-General,34 a case which Professor Todd 
described as "worthy of rather an ingenious exam question",35 the Court had to 
address the rule directly. In this case the plaintiffs boat The Nomad was used, 
unbeknown to the plaintiff, by a prospective purchaser to import heroin into New 
Zealand. The purchaser was arrested and The Nomad was seized by the Customs 
Department. Under the Customs Act 1966, property in the vessel was forfeited to the 
Crown. Williams tried, and after three years succeeded, in getting the forfeiture 
unconditionally waived by the Minister of Customs. However during this time The 
Nomad had been neglected, suffering water damage and vandalism. 
The question was simply whether the Crown owed a duty of care to Williams even 
though, at the time of the damage, Williams had neither ownership nor possession of 
the vessel. The Court held 3-2 that it did. Richardson and Casey JJ dissenting, held 
that the exclusionary rule applied and denied recovery. 36 The majority allowed 
recovery on the basis that sufficient proximity existed between the parties to justify a 
duty of care. Although this reasoning suggests that the exclusionary rule was rejected 
in favour of a more flexible approach, all three majority judges were careful to 
distinguish, rather than disagree with, The Mineral Transporter and The Aliakmon. 
Each judge reasoned that the unique statutory background to the present case reduced 
those authorities to limited assistance.37 In fact both Cooke P and Bisson J went to 
some lengths to reconcile the result with the exclusionary rule, holding that the 
Customs Act actually gave Williams a property interest in The Nomad whilst it was 
forfeited. 38 
33 Seddon v Ryans Carriers Ltd above n32, I 0. 
34 
[ 1990] I NZLR 646. 
35 Stephen Todd "Duties of care: the New Zealand Jurisprudence Part 2: Particular Duty Problems" 
(1993) 9 Professional Negligence 54. 
36 Williams v Attorney-Genera/ above n32, 679 per Richardson J; 687 per Casey J. Although 
Richardson J emphatically upheld the rule it is fair to say that Casey J relied more heavily on the 
statutory scheme than on the rule. 
37 Williams v Attorney-General above n32, 672 per Cooke P; 685 per Somers J; and 691 per Bisson J. 
38 Williams v Attorney-Genera/ above n32, 672 per Cooke P; 692 per Bisson J. 
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The other Court of Appeal reference is Cooke P's comment in Brown v Heathcote 
County Council that:39 
There appears to be nothing in any New Zealand decision contrary to the 
decisions of the Privy Council and the House of Lords in The Mineral 
Transporter and The Aliakmon. 
This is questionable, and at the time it was written appears to have been inaccurate as 
the New Zealand Forests case had been decided more than a year earlier. But if the 
President's gloss was a slight oversight, Barker J's failure in New Zealand Forests to 
even refer to any of the exclusionary rule cases was, with respect, a major mistake. It 
appears that - perhaps because the relevant authorities were not put to him - Barker J 
did not recognise that he was dealing with a textbook relational economic loss case. 
His Honour's judgment is essentially a rejection of the majority approach in the 
Spartan Steel case which he regarded as "in pari materia with the present".40 But the 
two cases are not the same. The crucial difference is that physical damage was caused 
to the plaintiff in Spartan Steel, but none was caused to the plaintiff in New Zealand 
Forests. Spartan Steel was a consequential loss case; New Zealand Forests, a 
relational loss case. 
Of course a New Zealand Court may at some time rule that the distinction between 
consequential and relational loss is without substance. However until then, different 
rules govern the different losses. Barker J's judgment simply considers the wrong set 
of cases. The result he reaches can be contrasted with that reached by the Scottish 
Court of Session in Dynamco Ltd v Holland and Hannen & Cubitts (Scotland) Ltcf1 
which, on identical facts ( a plaintiff company suing for loss of profits following the 
negligent damage of their electricity supply cable) applied the exclusionary to deny 
recovery. 
The current law in New Zealand is thus extremely unclear. This was highlighted by a 
recent District Court case which involved very similar facts to The Mineral 
39 Brown above n9 , 79. 
40 New Zealand Forests above n16, 16. 
4 1 [1972] SLT 38. 
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Transporter - a plaintiff time charterer suing for repair costs and lost profits 
occasioned by the defendant's negligent damage to the time chartered vessel. The 
case, Toho Line Ltd v Kaimai Stevedore Services Ltd,42 was an application by the 
defendant to strike out the plaintiffs claim. The Court refused to do so. Among its 
reasons it stated that the New Zealand approach has moved in a "case-by-case" 
direction inconsistent with the rigid application of the exclusionary rule. 43 The Court 
then doubted whether on the current state of New Zealand law "The Mineral 
Transporter decision is either binding on New Zealand Courts or 1s even 
applicable".44 Surely this puts the issue a little too strongly, but it can be read as a 
timely indication of the real uncertainty in New Zealand law. 
Put simply, this is an issue which cnes out for rigorous judicial attention. New 
Zealand's flexible approach to negligence law sits very uncomfortably with the 
continued existence of a rule requiring a proprietary or possessory interest in damaged 
property to sue in respect of damage to it. However this rule has been well 
entrenched in the Common Law for over 100 years, and far from being overruled in 
this country, it has received tacit encouragement at regular intervals. To return to the 
power crisis which sparked this discussion, if Mercury Energy were to be sued by a 
party suffering only contractual relational economic loss, it is far from clear which 
side would win. 
III COMPARATIVE APPROACHES 
This part of the paper will explore the different approaches to contractual relational 
economic loss taken by overseas jurisdictions. The frame of reference is the English 
approach which has already been outlined in some detail.45 This section will first 
42 [1996] DCR 524 [Toho]. 
43 Toho above n42, 536. This is a view shared by Stephen Todd "Duties of care: the New Zealand 
jurisprudence Part 2: Particular duty problems" above n35 , 55. 
44 Toho above n42, 537. The Court questioned whether the rule in Bruer v Wright [1982] 2 NZLR 77 
that Privy Council decisions are generally to be considered binding in all Commonwealth courts, or the 
exception for divergent local circumstances illustrated by Jnvercargill City Council v Hamlin [1996] 1 
NZLR 513 was most applicable to this issue: 536-537. 
45 English case law does contain one important exception to the exclusionary rule in the case of 
Morrison Steamship Co Ltd v Greystoke Castle (Cargo Owners) [1947] AC 265 (HL). In this case two 
ships collided, both sustaining damage. The plaintiff was the owner of cargo carried on one of them. 
Although the plaintiffs cargo was not damaged, the plaintiff was contractually liable to contribute in 
general average with the owner of the ship for the cost of repair to the ship. The House held that an 
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address the law in Australia which has moved in a different direction. It will then, in 
deference to the significant judicial attention this issue has recently received there, 
more extensively review the Canadian developments. 
A Australia 
The High Court of Australia appeared to reject the exclusionary rule in the landmark 
case of Caltex Oil (Australia) Pty Ltd v The Dredge Willemstad. 46 In this case the 
defendant's dredge negligently fractured a pipeline belonging to a third party, AOR. 
The plaintiff Caltex used this pipeline for transporting oil from AOR's refinery to its 
terminal. The oil in the pipeline was the property of Caltex. Caltex sued the 
defendant for the economic loss it suffered by having to re-route its oil by land. The 
five member bench each allowed recovery, although each for different reasons. 
Despite thei_r apparent disagreement, each judge essentially applied a type of 
proximity test and found that Caltex and AOR were so closely linked that either an 
exception should be made to the rule (Gibbs and Jacobs JJ),47 or the rule should be 
rejected (Murphy, Mason and Stephen JJ).48 Stephen J made this process explicit, 
ruling that the concept of proximity was a more appropriate control mechanism of 
indeterminate liability than a doctrinaire distinction between economic and physical 
damage.49 In doing so, his Honour emphasised a point crucial to this paper. This is 
that the debate over the exclusionary rule is really a debate over the core concepts 
which limit liability. Stephen J openly treated this issue as a decision whether 
proximity or damage type should be the primary control of liability in negligence. 
exception to the exclusionary rule exists where two parties are engaged in a "common adventure" (see 
280 per Lord Roche; 296 per Lord Porter). The plaintiff was therefore able to recover its share of the 
repair costs. 
46 (1976) 136 CLR 529 [Calte.x]. 
47 Gibbs J created an exception where the defendant knows that the plaintiff "individually, and not 
merely as a member of an unascertained class" will be affected: Calte.x above n46, 555. Jacobs J, on 
the other hand, confined the exclusionary rule to the loss of a contractual benefit and held that it did not 
apply where the defendant's negligence has a "physical effect" on the plaintiff: Calte.x above n46, 60 I . 
48 Murphy J shortly stated that he saw no reason why it should apply: Calte.x above n46, 606; Mason J 
held that Hedley Byrne had ramifications beyond the area of negligent misstatement and that the 
exclusionary rule is based on "an absolute distinction between property damage and economic damage 
which is difficult to justify": Calte.x above n46, 591 ; and Stephen J applied a proximity test: see text 
and below n49. 
49 Calte.x above n46, 574-575 per Stephen J. 
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Clearly, the Caltex decision did not present a united front - so much so that the House 
of Lords in The Mineral Transporter refused to accept the case as a rejection of the 
exclusionary rule. 50 Very few would advance this proposition today. Karen Hogg 
argues that "it would be unrealistic, if not absurd, to suggest that the High Court 
would now retreat from the Caltex decision and reaffirm the traditional exclusory 
rule". 51 She argues that the received interpretation of Caltex is in accordance with 
Stephen J's judgment: there is no absolute bar on the recovery of relational loss. 
Liability is instead decided by applying the proximity principle. 
B Canada 
Contractual relational economic loss has been closely debated in Canada. In fact, it 
has been the subject of two recent Supreme Court decisions: Canadian National 
Railways v Norsk Pacific Steamship Co52 and Bow Valley Husky (Bermuda) Ltd v 
Saint John Shipbuilding Ltd. 53 Each will be addressed in turn. 
1 Norsk 
The Norsk case involved relatively simple facts. In foggy weather, the defendant's 
tug negligently collided with a railway bridge. The plaintiff, Canadian National 
Railways ("CNR"), was the principal user of this bridge and accounted for around 
85% of traffic across it. It also owned land and rail track close to either side of the 
bridge. It had used the bridge continuously since 1915 and many people (including 
the captain of the tug) believed CNR to own it. However it did not own the bridge, 
but contracted to use it from its owner, the Canadian Government. This contract 
(unlike those made with the other three railway companies using the bridge) required 
CNR to undertake general maintenance work and to make any necessary repairs to the 
bridge at Canada's expense. CNR also arranged inspections of the bridge from time 
to time and provided consulting services to Canada free of charge. CNR sued Norsk 
50 The Mineral Transporter above n25, 24. 
51 Karen Hogg "Relational Loss, the Exclusory Rule and the High Court of Australia" (1995) 3 Tort L 
Rev 26, 36. 
52 (1992) 91 DLR (4th) 289 [Norsk]. 
53 (1998) 153 DLR (41h) 385 [Bow Valley]. 
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for its added costs in re-routing its trains over an upstream bridge and sometimes by 
land. 
The scenario was thus very similar to the Caltex case. The result was also similarly, 
but not as extensively, fragmented. The Supreme Court found by a 4-3 majority for 
CNR. However its reasoning was split three ways. McLachlin J (L'Heureux-Dube 
and Cory JJ concurring) delivered the main majority judgment. The fourth majority 
judge was Stevenson J, who found for CNR for different reasons. The dissent was 
delivered by La Forest J (Sopinka and Iacobucci JJ concurring). Both McLachlin and 
La Forest JJ expressly rejected Stevenson J's reasoning. 54 The result was, therefore, 
that no more than three of the seven judges supported any single ratio. Both the main 
majority judgment and the dissent present powerful, reasoned arguments. This paper 
shall address each in turn. 
(a) McLachlin J's judgment 
McLachlin J defined the issue as "the extent to which damages for pure economic loss 
may be recovered in tort at common law". 55 After reviewing the developments in 
other jurisdictions, her Honour identified "two different approaches to the problem of 
defining the legal parameters of common law rules": 56 the bright-line exclusionary 
approach as applied in Murphy; and the proximity based, case-by-case approach as 
applied in Anns. Her Honour firmly adopted the latter approach. Thus her test is the 
familiar two-step process: proximity is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition of 
liability which may be negatived by policy considerations.57 She stated: 58 
Proximity is the controlling concept which avoids the spectre of 
unlimited liability. Proximity may be established by a variety of factors, 
depending on the nature of the case. 
54 Stevenson J rejected the exclusionary rule and applied the "known plaintiff' test, similar to that 
applied by Gibbs J in Caltex. La Forest J described this as placing "a premium on noteriety": Norsk 
above n52, 342, a description adopted by McLachlin J: Norsk above n52, 377. 
55 Norsk above n52, 358. 
56 Norsk above n52, 366. 
57 Norsk above n52, 3 71. 
58 Norsk above n52, 369. 
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Proximity, then, was McLachlin J's solution to the indeterminacy problem. This 
solution is a universal concept "capable of subsuming different categories of cases 
involving different factors". 59 
Applying this test to the facts, her Honour found firstly that CNR was in close 
physical proximity to the bridge by virtue of its land ownership on either side and also 
by its high use of the bridge, such that its trains were actually in danger of physical 
injury by the accident. 60 The fact that this did not eventuate was irrelevant. More 
importantly McLachlin J emphasised the proximity between CNR and the direct 
victim, Canada. She concluded that CNR' s obligations to Canada brought their 
relationship into the joint venture category recognised in such cases as Greystoke.61 
As there were no overwhelming policy reasons to deny recovery, CNR was entitled to 
recover. Ultimately, McLachlin J characterised her approach as fair and flexible, 
unfettered by absolute rules based on different categories of loss. 
(b) La Forest J' s judgment 
La Forest J's approach began with a narrower question than that of his colleague. His 
Honour stated the issue as whether contractual relational economic loss is 
recoverable. 62 Thus his judgment distinguishes its approach to limiting liability from 
McLachlin J' s from the outset. Instead of treating all economic loss as an 
homogenous group, his Honour is concerned to deal with the peculiarities of 
relational economic loss. La Forest J explained the reason for this approach: 63 
To phrase the key issue in this case as a simple one of " is pure economic 
loss recoverable in tort?" is misleading. I do not doubt that pure economic 
loss is recoverable in some cases. It does not follow, however, that all 
economic loss cases are susceptible to the same analysis, or that cases of 
one type are necessarily relevant to cases of another. . . The fact is that 
different types of factual situations may invite different approaches to 
59 Norsk above n52, 368. 
60 Norsk above n52, 368. 
6 1 Morrison Steamship Co Ltd v Greystoke Castle (Cargo Owners) [1947] AC 265 (HL). See above 
n45. 
62 Norsk above n52, 291 . 
63 Norsk above n52, 299 . 
economic loss, and it seems to me to be at best unwise to lump them all 
together for purposes of analysis. 
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In taking this approach, La Forest J acknowledged his debt to the work of Professor 
Feldthusen whose article "Economic Loss in the Supreme Court of Canada: Yesterday 
and Tomorrow"64 argued that all economic loss is not identical and can be divided up 
into five distinct categories, each presenting unique policy considerations.65 La Forest 
J adopts Feldthusen's argument that the fifth category - (contractual) relational 
economic loss - should be barred by an exclusionary rule. 66 This is because of the 
important differences between contractual relational economic loss and other pure 
economic loss. 
Firstly, it is by definition a secondary liability - the tortfeasor is already liable to the 
victim of the physical damage. This means that the deterrence goal of tort law is at 
least partially fulfilled without need for further litigation. Secondly, La Forest J 
argued that an exclusionary rule does not deprive the plaintiff from compensation. It 
merely "channels" the plaintiffs claim towards the property owner. If the contract 
between the two excludes the owner's liability, this will most likely be because the 
parties are agreed that the plaintiff "is in the best position to insure the risk at the 
lowest cost". 67 Thirdly, his Honour observed that there is a much bigger pool of 
contractual relational economic loss claimants than persons suffering other pure 
economic loss. 
Applying the exclusionary rule to CNR's claim, La Forest J identified an exception 
for joint venture cases. However his Honour disagreed that CNR was engaged in a 
joint venture with Canada. The reason was that under the contract, CNR was not 
64 (1991) 17 CBLJ 356. 
65 Norsk above n52, 299-300 . The categories are: the independent liability of statutory public 
authorities; negligent misrepresentation; negligent performance of a service; negligent supply of 
shoddy goods or structures; and relational economic loss. La Forest J slightly rearranges them into a 
broad three-category structure of (I) consequential loss cases: (2) non-relational loss cases (into which 
Feldthusen 's categories 1-4 belong); and (3) contractual relational economic loss: Norsk, above n52, 
302. See generally Bruce Feldthusen Economic Negligence (2ed, Toronto, Carswell, 1989) and Bruce 
Feldthusen "The Recovery of Pure Economic Loss in Canada: Proximity, Justice, Rationality, and 
Chaos" ( 1996) 24 Manitoba LJ I . 
66 Feldthusen ' s category included all relational economic loss. La Forest J's judgment was confined to 
contractual relational economic loss, which was the only loss suffered by CNR. 
67 Norsk above n52, 302. 
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required to contribute to Canada's loss. His Honour pointed out that CNR did not 
have to perform any service without payment. 68 
La Forest J also rejected CNR's argument that it had an alternative interest in the 
bridge by virtue of the "transferred loss" doctrine. An exception to the exclusionary 
rule where the property owner's loss is transferred to the plaintiff was forcefully 
argued by Robert Goff LJ in the dissenting judgment of the English Court of Appeal 
decision in The Aliakmon. 69 His Honour defined transferred loss as loss which would 
ordinarily fall on the owner of the goods, falling on the buyer in circumstances where 
the owner may lack the incentive to enforce its right of action.70 The House of Lords 
rejected this exception. 71 
La Forest J did not actually state whether transferred loss is a true exception to the 
rule. He did, however, hold that such loss only occurs where the risk of property 
damage has passed, but the right to the property has not. 72 CNR's loss was not 
transferred because it never assumed the risk of property damage. Canada was clearly 
required to pay for repairs to the bridge and it did so. CNR's claim was purely for 
loss of use. 
It followed that CNR had nothing more than a contractual right to use the bridge. His 
Honour lastly examined arguments that for special reasons a new exception to the 
exclusionary rule should be made. His Honour made it clear that a new exception 
would only be made where the plaintiff could: 73 
... respond effectively not only to the concern about indeterminacy but 
also show that no adequate means of protection is available. 
68 Norsk above n52, 334. 
69 The Aliakmon [1985] 1 QB 350 [The Aliakmon CA]. 
70 The Aliakmon CA above n69, 396 per GoffLJ . 
71 The Aliakmon above n29, 819-820. 
72 The reason for this narrow definition is that every contract to use an asset assigns some of the 
property owner's rights to the contracting party. Thus damage caused by interference with any 
contractual right over property is all, in a sense, transferred loss. 
73 Norsk above n52, 355. 
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His Honour shortly disposed of the argument that the indeterminacy problem was not 
an issue as it was widely known that CNR used the bridge. 74 He stated that such 
knowledge is in principle irrelevant to who should recover for contractual relational 
economic loss. His Honour then addressed CNR's alternative means of protection. 
He concluded that CNR was clearly in the best position to guard against the loss it 
suffered. La Forest J observed that both CNR and Canada were sophisticated 
contracting parties well aware of the risk of bridge failure and the losses this could 
cause CNR. In fact previous damage of the same bridge had been the subject of 
earlier (unsuccessful) litigation by CNR: Gypsum Carrier Inc v The Queen.75 
Essentially, La Forest J held that CNR should have built the price of insurance for loss 
into its contract with Canada. He saw no reason why CNR and Norsk should both 
have to insure for contractual relational economic loss, which he argued would be the 
outcome of McLachlin J' s case-by-case proximity test. 
( c) The two approaches in perspective 
Both judgments were openly trying to do the same thing - find a principled solution 
to the indeterminacy problem. At their narrowest they differ only on the definition of 
a joint venture: La Forest J's is tightly contractual; McLachlin J's is more pragmatic. 
However this superficial similarity obscures the very different reasoning each judge 
employed. As noted, McLachlin J adopted an Anns-style test as the mechanism for 
controlling indeterminate liability. The touchstone of this is the concept of proximity. 
McLachlin J explicitly rejected strict rules based on different types of damage. 
La Forest J, by contrast, dismissed proximity as expressing a result rather than a 
principle. 76 His control mechanism is based on the type of damage suffered. 
However, not only did his Honour embrace the physical/economic damage distinction 
underlying the exclusionary rule, he made it far more sophisticated. La Forest J's 
entire approach is concerned with breaking economic loss itself into different subsets 
which further regulate recovery. 
74 Norsk above n52, 339-340. 
75 (1977) 78 DLR (3d) 175. 
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2 Bow Valley 
This case was the Supreme Court's opportunity to clear up the uncertainty created by 
their decision in Norsk. 77 They took it. The lead judgment is delivered by 
McLachlin J with La Forest J concurring. Her analysis of the contractual relational 
economic loss issue in the case is also accepted by the other judgment, delivered by 
Iacobucci J (Gonther, Cory and Major JJ concurring). Although phrased in the 
language of compromise, a closer analysis reveals a total capitulation. 
Two companies named Husky Oil ("Husky") and Bow Valley decided to pursue a 
drilling opportunity off the coast of Canada. One of Bow Valley's subsidiaries 
therefore contracted with Saint John Shipbuilding ("Saint John") for the construction 
of a drilling rig. In order to take advantage of offshore financing Husky and Bow 
Valley incorporated an offshore company, Bow Valley Husky Ltd ("BVH"), to which 
they transferred ownership of the rig before construction began. Husky and Bow 
Valley then entered into four year leases of the rig for drilling. 78 These required that 
they pay BVH day rates even in the event that the rig was out of service. 
Due to negligence by both Saint John and BHV a fire broke out on the rig and it was 
out of service for several months. Husky and Bow Valley sued for their wasted hire 
costs as well as additional expenses including food and equipment costs. 
McLachlin J held that they could not recover. She began by emphasising the 
similarities between her own and La Forest J's judgment in Norsk. Her Honour stated 
that both she and La Forest J agreed that contractual relational economic loss is only 
76 Norsk above n52, 344. This phrase is borrowed from Stevenson J, who also rejected the concept: 
Norsk above n52, 386-387. 
77 This uncertainty had led to interim cases being decided in accordance with both approaches: 
D 'Amato v Badger ( 1996) 137 DLR ( 4th) 129 (SCC). 
78 These leases did not give Bow Valley and Husky either a proprietary or possessory interest in the rig. 
Although leases typically give possession, Bow Valley and Husky accepted that these particular leases 
did not. Under maritime law concepts, the leases were not charters by demise. The Newfoundland 
Court of Appeal stated that: "[t]here is, in this case, no right to use the property of [BVH]; rather it is a 
contractual right to have a service performed, the drilling of wells in places specified": Bow Valley 
Husky (Bermuda) Ltd v Saint John Shipbuilding Ltd (1995) 126 DLR (4th) 1, 42-43 [Bow Valley 
Newfoundland CA]. 
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recoverable in special circumstances which are defined by reference to categories and 
that these categories are not closed. Significantly, her Honour then set out La Forest 
J's "categories", which she described as the exclusionary rule with exceptions for 
certain admiralty cases79 and joint ventures. McLachlin J concluded that the case at 
bar did not fall into any of the three categories.80 Her Honour then stated that: 81 
Where a case does not fall within a recognised category the court may go 
on to consider whether the situation is one where the right to recover 
contractual relational economic loss should nevertheless be 
recognised ... At the same time, courts should not assiduously seek new 
categories; what is required is a clear rule predicting when recovery is 
available. 
As a guide to the establishment of new categories, her Honour began a detailed 
analysis of La Forest J's judgment in the recent negligent misstatement case of 
Hercules Management 's Ltd v Ernst v Young. 82 The Supreme Court treated this case 
as a claim for relational economic loss. McLachlin J described La Forest J's 
judgment in this case as upholding the "two-part methodology of Anns"83 and 
deciding that "the existence of a relationship of 'neighbourhood ' or 'proximity ' 
distinguishes those circumstances in which the defendant owes a duty of care to the 
plaintiff from where no such duty exists" .84 McLachlin J declared this approach 
equally applicable to contractual relational economic loss. 85 
In applying this test, her Honour found sufficient proximity to exist under the first 
step, but that the duty of care was negatived by "the policy concerns that usually 
preclude recovery of contractual relational economic loss".86 Essentially this was the 
indeterminacy problem: McLachlin J found that there was no principled way for 
Husky and Bow Valley to distinguish themselves from any other class of potential 
79 Where the plaintiff is required to make a "general average" contribution. See Greystoke n45 . 
80 Her Honour also rejects the suggestion that the plaintiffs suffered transferred loss from BVH: Bow 
Valley above n53 , 410. She does not state whether they would have recovered if they had . 
81 Bow Valley above n53 , 406-407 . 
82 (1997) 146 DLR (4th) 577 [Hercules]. 
83 Bow Valley above n53 , 408. 
84 Bow Valley above n53 , 408 . 
85 Bow Valley above n53 , 409 . 
86 Bow Valley above n53 , 409 . 
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claimants. Her Honour also noted that this was a case where sophisticated parties 
knowingly allocated their risks beforehand. Under the leases with BVH, the risk of 
downtime specifically fell on Husky and Bow Valley. 
So, what is the result? Does Bow Valley apply McLachlin J's proximity test or La 
Forest J's exclusionary rule? Iacobucci J confidently stated the latter:87 
I understand my colleague's discussion of this matter to mean that she 
has adopted the general exclusionary rule and categorical exceptions 
approach set forth by La Forest Jin Norsk. 
This appears to be the correct assessment. Confirmation can be found by reading La 
Forest J's judgment in Hercules upon which McLachlin J relied so heavily. Although 
her Honour is correct that La Forest J does refer to proximity, her implication that this 
was in some way a compromise of his approach in Norsk is misleading. Indeed his 
Honour stated:88 
In approaching [the question of proximity], I would begin by reiterating 
the position I took in Norsk ... that the term " proximity" itself is nothing 
more than a label expressing a result, judgment or conclusion: it does not, 
in and of itself, provide a principled basis on which to make a legal 
determination. 
This is clear from the way in which he then used the proximity concept. He did so 
by defining, with reference to precedent and policy reasons, when liability will lie in 
1. · · 89 neg 1gent m1srepresentat10n cases. He then labelled this result proximity. 
Proximity in Hercules indicates but certainly does not define, when liability exists. 
Therefore, although the language of the Anns-test has been retained, the substance of 
the test has not. The test McLachlin J applied in Bow Valley was the exclusionary 
rule. Her Honour only referred to the proximity concept later in deciding whether a 
cautious exception to the rule should be permitted. 
87 Bow Valley above n53 , 428 . 
88 Hercules above n82, 588. 
89 Hercules above n82, 587. 
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Even then, this was only lip service. What happened in Bow Valley is what will 
almost always happen: proximity will be found to exist, but the usual policy 
considerations which support the exclusionary rule in the first place will then be 
invoked to negative liability. The Bow Valley test for when a new exception should 
be made is in substance the same as the test applied by La Forest J in Norsk: a bare 
analysis of policy factors. 90 The only difference is that the word proximity has been 
inserted into its workings. 
The point is that whatever proximity now describes, it is no longer the determinant of 
liability applied by McLachlin J in Norsk. If it were, then surely the result in Bow 
Valley would have different. If the relationship between CNR and Canada could be 
labelled a joint venture and satisfy any negative policy concerns, the relationship 
between two companies and the shadow company they erect purely for tax purposes 
must also be a joint venture. 
Indeed, many of the problems the Norsk case posed were conspicuously absent in 
Bow Valley. Unlike the public rail bridge used by four companies, the rig was 
private property and was only used by Husky and Bow Valley. Husky and Bow 
Valley also had a close relationship with the property owner BVH - they created and 
each owned shares in it. This is in contrast to the very distinct entities of CNR and 
Canada. Further, the leases between Bow Valley, Husky and BVH did not contain 
the clause found in CNR's contract with Canada which totally excluded Canada's 
liability to CNR in the case of damage to the bridge. Thus there was less basis from 
which to infer that the parties had definitively allocated their risks. It is submitted 
that the only explanation for the disparate results in Norsk and Bow Valley is that 
different tests were applied. 
The Canadian test is now the exclusionary rule with exceptions for certain admiralty 
cases, joint ventures (however defined) and possibly transferred loss cases. Where a 
situation falls inside the rule and outside the exceptions, there is a possibility that a 
new exception may be created if a sufficiently principled basis can be suggested. 
90 See Norsk above n52, 335-353 and especially 355. 
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What is clear is that the case-by-case proximity approach has been quietly laid to 
rest. 
IV ANALYSIS: MERITS OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE 
A What is Really at Issue: the Debate within the Debate 
It has been seen that England has continued to apply the exclusionary rule and that 
Canada has recently joined it. Australia, on the other hand, has rejected the rule. 
New Zealand is somewhere in the middle, although it appears to be moving away 
from the rule. 
To this point, this paper has shown which sides were chosen. The remainder of the 
paper reveals what the fight was really about. This insight owes a debt to the 
sophisticated Canadian analysis. McLachlin and La Forest JJ's disagreement in 
Norsk made explicit the real issue underlying debates about the exclusionary rule. 
The fundamental disagreement is not about the rule itself, but about the approach to 
negligence law the rule implies. 
Essentially, the issue is the old chestnut of economic loss - the indeterminacy 
problem. Consideration of the exclusionary rule demands the answer to a far bigger 
question, namely: which device should be used to decide when economic loss will be 
recoverable? 
Although the many judicial labels and careful distinctions imply otherwise, it is 
submitted - and this was recognised by both Canadian judges - that in fact the cases 
reveal only two such devices. 91 This article shall refer to these as the "proximity 
approach" and the "categorical approach".92 
91 See Norsk above n52, 366 per McLachlin J; 302, 344, and 356-357, per La Forest J. This basic 
distinction is also recognised by Lord Goff in Smith v Littlewoods above n5, 280; Bruce Feldthusen 
Economic Loss (led, Toronto, Carswell, 1984), 3; Hon Sir Anthony Mason in "The Recovery and 
Calculation of Economic Loss" in Nicholas Mullany (ed) Torts in the Nineties (LBC Information 
Services, North Ryde, 1997) 1, 4-6 ; Keith Stanton " Incremental Approaches to the Duty of Care" in 
Nicholas Mullany (ed) Torts in the Nineties this note, 34, 34-37; and Karen Hogg Vaggelas "Proximity, 
Economic Loss and the High Court of Australia" ( 1997) 5 Tort L Rev 127, 127. 
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The proximity approach is epitomised by the Anns-test and has two essential 
features . First, it is concerned with similarities: it works by distilling general 
principles from disparate cases. It is therefore a universal test which is equally 
applicable to different situations. Secondly, a proximity approach proceeds on a 
case-by-case basis. It does not control liability by reference to fixed rules, but with 
regard to general principles or considerations of what is "fair and reasonable".93 
Therefore it is implicit that "proximity is not susceptible of an exact . .. definition"94 
and this is part of its appeal. 
The categorical approach, by contrast, is concerned with differences. Its starting 
point is Feldthusen's observation that "[w]ithin the category of claims for economic 
loss there exist more differences between and among the cases than similarities".95 It 
therefore does not seek not to distil the general principles underlying negligence 
liability as a whole. Instead, at least with respect to pure economic loss, it replaces 
broad principles by category-specific rules and policy considerations. This approach 
can be currently seen in both Feldthusen' s separate categories of economic loss and 
in the so-called "incremental approach" recently embraced by the House of Lords in 
Caparo Industries Plc v Dickman.96 
The debate about the exclusionary rule is inevitably based on these broader 
assumptions about how tort law should work. The reason is that the rule - far from 
being neutral - picks sides. Being particular to relational economic loss, the rule 
inherently implies a categorical approach based on different types of economic loss. 
92 The point should be made again this dichotomy groups together fundamentally similar - but 
sometimes superficially different - approaches . It thus makes some reluctant bedfellows. For 
instance, while Lord Cooke has never been an enthusiast of the proximity criterion ("An Impossible 
Distinction" (1991 ) I 07 LQR 46, 54), the approach his Honour describes in South Pacific (above n7) 
is, on this analysis, clearly a "proximity" approach. Again, although Australia has eschewed the Anns-
test because of its perceived emphasis on reasonable forseeability, on this analysis both Lord 
Wilberforce and the High Court of Australia share the same approach. 
93 See for example South Pacific above n7, 297 per Cooke P; and Bruce Feldthusen "The Recovery of 
Pure Economic Loss in Canada: Proximity, Justice, Rationality, and Chaos" above n65 , 5. 
94 Hon Sir Anthony Mason in "The Recovery and Calculation of Economic Loss" in Nicholas Mullany 
( ed) Torts in the Nineties above n91 , 4. 
95 Bruce Feldthusen "The Recovery of Pure Economic Loss in Canada: Proximity, Justice, Rationality, 
and Chaos" above n65, 3. 
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The effects of this can be seen in practice. Where the rule has been endorsed, as in 
England and Canada, a broad-based proximity approach has been concomitantly 
rejected.97 Where the rule has been rejected, the alternatives offered have been 
proximity tests.98 This makes sense. The main objection to the exclusionary rule is 
usually not to its specific content, but to its general nature. Typically, objectors are 
proximity adherents who fundamentally do not believe in controlling liability by 
categories. They see no value in absolute distinctions between different types of 
loss.99 
In short, the two issues are inextricably linked. Subscribers to a categorical approach 
naturally support the exclusionary rule as the most appropriate control mechanism 
for contractual relational economic loss. Conversely, supporters of a proximity 
approach do not treat such loss as a distinct group. They naturally reject the rule as 
inconsistent with the case-by-case proximity analysis. 
Therefore, the debate over the exclusionary rule is really about whether the proximity 
or· the categorical approach should be preferred. I shall address this question by 
discussing each approach generally, but with particular emphasis on how they deal 
with contractual relational economic loss. 
96 [1990) 2 AC 605. It can also be discerned from earlier English cases such as Muirhead v Industrial 
Tank Specialities Ltd [ 1985) 3 WLR 993. 
97 Although both England and Canada reach a similar conclusion on contractual relational economic 
loss , their rules governing the recoverability of economic loss in general are of course different. 
Canada does not accept the wider exclusionary rule of Murphy: see Norsk above n52, 303 per La 
Forest J; 365 per McLachlin J. Nevertheless, it is submitted that both jurisdictions apply a categorical 
approach - England just does so more bluntly, treating all economic loss (apart from negligent 
misstatement) as a single category. 
98 See McLachlin J's judgment in Norsk above n52 and the various approaches in Caltex above n46. 
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B The Proximity Approach vs the Categorical Approach 
1 The proximity approach 
Proponents of a proximity criterion argue that it is only this which lends negligence 
law a "unifying theme". 100 Instead of applying rules to distinguish between claimants, 
proximity looks to the essence of when recovery was allowed in previous cases and 
makes reasoned analogies to later ones. 
This process of analogy takes account of all relevant factors which establish the 
relationship between the plaintiff and the tortfeasor. It thus allows the structure of 
relationships to prevail over factual differences between cases. A good example is the 
"reliance" concept, first advocated as an indicator of proximity (although not in those 
words) for negligent misstatement in Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller & Partners 
Ltd. 101 The High Court of Australia later used this same concept in the quite different 
contexts of council liability (Sutherland Shire Council v Heyman); 102 professional 
negligent acts (Hawkins v Clayton); 103 and defective house construction (Bryan v 
Maloney). 104 
The proximity criterion 1s a healthy reaction to unreasoned, precedent-based 
restrictions on liability exemplified by Murphy. The proximity approach does not 
treat factual distinctions between cases, such as the exact form of loss suffered or 
whether the negligence is in the form of words or deeds, as decisive. Instead, a 
careful analysis of each case is undertaken to establish the closeness of the 
relationship. In Norsk, McLachlin J defined the approach in this way: 105 
99 See Norsk above n52, 366-367 per McLachlin J; Caltex above n46, 567-572 per Stephen J; and 606 
per Murphy J. 
100 Burnie Port Authority v General Jones Pty Ltd ( 1994) 179 CLR 520, 543 per Mason CJ, Deane, 
Dawson, Toohey, and Gaudron JJ. 
IOI [1964] AC 465. 
102 (1985) 157 CLR 424. 
103 (1988) 164 CLR 539. 
104 (1995) 182 CLR 609 . For an example of reliance being used as a general indicator of proximity, see 
South Pacific above n7, 300 per Cooke P. 
105 Norsk above n52, 369. This is a paraphrase of Deane J's famous passage in Sutherland Shire 
Council v Heyman above n 102, 497 in which his Honour outlined some of the many disparate factors 
which inform the concept. 
Proximity may consist of various forms of closeness - physical, 
circumstantial, causal or assumed - which serve to identify the categories 
of cases in which liability lies. 
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Of course the proximity approach usually does not stop there. Another important 
limiting factor is often the consideration of any policy concerns which militate against 
the imposition of liability. This second step increases the flexibility of the test as a 
whole. 
The flipside of this flexibility is of course a degree of uncertainty. La Forest J rightly 
pointed out in Norsk that McLachlin J's finding of proximity between CNR and 
Canada did not provide a clear rule of liability for future use. His Honour dismissed 
the test as having "practically no predictive value".106 While a decrease in certainty 
might be a reasonable price to pay for an increase in principle, it is debatable whether 
this is really what proximity delivers. 
La Forest J's statement (which is perhaps an overstatement) hints at a deeper 
problem with proximity. This is that its lack of predictive value stems from its lack 
of basic content. Proximity often expresses a result, not a principle. This objection 
goes to the heart of the principled image which proximity cultivates and casts 
proximity as merely a label for an old-fashioned policy decision. 107 This has long 
been Brennan J's outspoken position in the High Court of Australia. 108 
The ramifications of this are more serious than a lack of theoretical precision. The 
real problem is that proximity can appear to be merely a collection of unrelated 
factors which, when applied to specific situations, are of questionable relevance. An 
obvious example is the known plaintiff test applied by Gibbs J in Caltex, Stevenson J 
in Norsk and Barker J in New Zealand Forests. The fact that the defendant 
specifically knew of the plaintiff does make their relationship closer in some respects 
106 Norsk above n52, 354. 
107 This appears to be accepted by Cooke P in South Pacific above n7, 299 where his Honour 
emphasised "the ineluctable importance of policy in this field". 
108 However, since his Honour's ascension to Chief Justice it appears to be gaining increased 
acceptance. In the recent decision of Hill (t/a RF Hill & Associates) v Van Erp (1997) 124 ALR 68, 
three of the six judgments (those of Brennan CJ, McHugh and Gummow JJ) rejected the proximity 
concept for this very reason . 
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than if the defendant had been unaware of the plaintiffs existence. But is this a 
relevant criterion on which to distinguish liability in a relational loss situation? 
The answer is probably not. As La Forest J pointed out in Norsk, contractual 
relational economic loss is usually the result of an accident. 109 It is not usually the 
result of a calculated risk known to be likely to affect the plaintiff. In negligent 
misstatement and products liability cases, for instance, the individuals foreseen by 
the tortfeasor as likely to rely on the advice or use the product are clearly relevant to 
the extent of the tortfeasor's liability. This is not so with a collision or other 
accident. In relational economic loss cases, the plaintiffs identity - far from being 
relevant to the defendant' s liability - is an unconnected fact. 
Further, the exact relevance of other common proximity factors such as physical and 
circumstantial closeness is also unclear. In the Norsk case, the finding of proximity 
was largely based on the fact that CNR was the preponderant user of the bridge and 
owned (undamaged) property nearby. Effectively, it was CNR' s "status as the 
property owner' s principal client" 11 0 together with its long history of using the bridge 
which distinguished it from the other three railway companies with contracts to use 
the bridge. It is doubtful whether this was a principled distinction. In fact, such an 
analysis does not seem so distant from the known plaintiff test. If CNR had had a 
lower profile in the region, it too may not have recovered. 
Thus although it is undeniable that the exclusionary rule makes arbitrary distinctions 
between plaintiffs, the same can also be said of the proximity approach. 111 The hazy 
basis of proximity is often only apparent when the scale of a case changes. The New 
Zealand Forests case concluded with the disclaimer by Barker J that "[ o ]f the 
situation of a power failure in an urban area where thousands might be affected to a 
greater or lesser degree, I am not required to rule".11 2 This indicates that Barker J's 
ratio may not be appropriate to the Auckland power crisis. If so, the ratio lacks 
109 Norsk above n52, 302. 
11 0 Robby Bernstein Economic Loss above n8, 168. 
111 See Norman Siebrase "Economic Analysis of Economic Loss in the Supreme Court of Canada: 
Fault, Deterrence, and Channelling of Losses in CNR v Norsk Pacific Steamship Co" 20 Queens LJ 1, 
51. 
112 New Zealand Forests above nl6, 20. 
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substance. A test for liability should not change in accordance with the number of 
potential plaintiffs. 113 
It appeared to do exactly this in a recent Australian case, Seas Sapfor Forests Pty Ltd 
v Electricity Trusts of South Australia. 114 In this case an electrical authority 
negligently started a bushfire. It was sued, inter alia, by millers of pine timber for 
relational economic loss suffered in the form of lost profits. The authority was held 
not liable for the reason that "the class of persons who profit from handling or 
dealing in produce of land damaged by bushfires" is unascertainable. 115 
From the facts of the case it is hard to see why this was so. As Lord Fraser noted in 
The Mineral Transporter, a large class is not unascertainable simply because it is 
large. 116 The result in Seas Sapfor Forests was thinly veiled expediency. The main 
judgment of Doyle CJ explicitly turned on the difference in scale between this and 
the Caltex case: " [t]he forests owned by the plaintiffs were not the only things 
affected, or likely to be affected, by an outbreak of fire. This is not the case of a 
specific pipe being broken; rather, it is a case of an entire countryside on fire". 117 
Both New Zealand Forests and Seas Sapfor Forests hint that proximity only really 
works in easy cases. They expose it as a crude attempt at justice rather than a 
principled analysis of neighbourhood. 
3 The categorical approach 
The argument against the categorical approach is that it is an abandonment of the 
unified approach to negligence liability begun in Donoghue v Stevenson. It is argued 
that without a universal test underlying all negligence liability, negligence law will 
11 3 As La Forest J points out in Norsk above n52, 338, this is precisely the problem which contractual 
relational economic loss causes for the proximity approach: "[t]he problem with this case from the 
perspective of indeterminate liability is that it involves a type of accident that will very likely lead to a 
great number of claims. It so happens, that on the facts of this case, the number of injured parties is 
small. The fact that Norsk was fortunate enough to hit a bridge with few users does not make its 
potential liability of contractual relational economic loss any less indeterminate." 
114 (9 August 1996) unreported, Federal Court, South Australia, SCGRG 263 of 1989. 
11 5 Seas Sapfor Forests above n 114, para 125 per Doyle CJ . 
11 6 The Mineral Transporter above n25, 24 . 
11 7 Seas Sapfor Forests above nl 14, para 95 . 
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become a set of inconsistent and dislocated cases. Principle will be sacrificed for 
certainty. This objection is central to the case against the exclusionary rule. 
Detractors observe that the rule is capricious and argue that its only merit is its 
simplicity. 
It is true that the distinction it makes between physical and economic loss sometimes 
leads to bizarre outcomes. For instance the defendant in The Aliakmon was happily 
relieved of liability for the cargo damage it undoubtedly caused. The unusual 
contractual arrangement between the buyer and the seller of the cargo meant that the 
buyer, who had the interest in suing, had no right to; whilst the seller, who had 
suffered no loss, retained a right to recover. Similarly in The Mineral Transporter, 
the fact that the owner had demised and recharted its own boat meant that the 
defendant escaped liability for loss which would have been recoverable had the 
owner not demised the vessel in the first place. 
Further, when the need for a possessory or proprietary interest is combined with the 
rule allowing recovery of economic loss consequent on physical damage, it is 
undeniable that "physical damage, however minuscule" makes all the difference. 118 
The basis for the categorical approach towards economic loss cases is that economic 
loss can be caused in "various ways with different consequences". 119 Thus the 
mechanism controlling liability should focus on these differences; not try to extract 
similarities from dissimilar situations. In particular, the categorical approach 
vehemently denies that to call loss "economic" is, of itself, a meaningful 
description. 120 A tendency to generalise from one type of economic loss to another 
simply leads to the creation of confused reasons for liability. Essentially the need for 
categories is that good reasons for when liability is allowed in one category are not 
necessarily translatable to another. 
118 Norsk above n52, 359 per McLachlin J. 
119 Hon Sir Anthony Mason in "The Recovery and Calculation of Economic Loss" in Nicholas Mullany 
( ed) Torts in the Nineties above n9 l, 5. 
120 Bruce Feldthusen "The Recovery of Pure Economic Loss in Canada: Proximity, Justice, Rationality, 
and Chaos" above n65, 2. 
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It follows that this approach does not entail a rejection of a unifying theme of 
negligence liability. It still endorses the Donoghue v Stevenson neighbourhood 
principle. The categorical approach simply accepts that one's neighbours vary 
according to where one lives. Instead of providing the same test of neighbourhood 
for all situations, it adapts that test for specific types of case. It is not true to say that 
it sacrifices principle for certainty. It merely identifies precise bases for principled 
distinctions. 
A clear example of why these are needed has already been mentioned in the 
discussion of proximity. The relevance of a known plaintiff to negligent 
misstatement and products liability cases is clear. Its relevance to relational 
economic loss cases is not. Feldthusen's five categories 121 distinguish between quite 
different situations. The categorical approach provides the opportunity to make 
relatively certain rules for liability without reliance on irrelevant factors. 
There are at least three unique policy considerations which make the exclusionary 
rule appropriate for contractual relational economic loss. The first is that such loss 
always occurs in situations where the tortfeasor is already liable to the property 
owner. The effect of this is important in that "the deterrent effect of tort law .. .is 
already present". 122 Thus, as Feldthusen points out, the question is not whether the 
tortfeasor should be held liable in negligence, but whether additional liability should 
be imposed. 123 
The second reason is that contractual relational economic loss cases, by definition, 
involve contracts. Plaintiffs have had the opportunity to consider how valuable their 
contractual rights are and how, if at all, they should protect them. If the rights are 
12 1 For the categories, see above n65. 
122 Norsk above n52, 301 . It is of course possible that the actual physical damage inflicted will be less 
than the relational economic loss suffered, a point noted by Siebrase "Economic Analysis of Economic 
Loss in the Supreme Court of Canada: Fault, Deterrence, and Channelling of Losses in CNR v Norsk 
Pacific Steamship Co" above nl 11, 36. In such a case there will be deterrence value in the additional 
liability which could be imposed. This is a good point. The two answers to it are firstly that any 
exclusionary rule should be flexible enough to take account of unusual cases; and secondly, that the 
problem is more theoretical than real. Ordinarily there would be some degree of correlation between 
the two types of loss . Presumably, little physical damage would usually cause relatively slight 
economic loss. 
123 Bruce Feldthusen "Economic Loss in the Supreme Court of Canada: Yesterday and Tomorrow" 
above n64, 377. 
.. 
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important, plaintiffs will typically have bargained for a contractual indemnity or 
factored the price of first-party insurance into the negotiations. There are of course 
many ways contractual rights may be disrupted, from natural causes to human error. 
This fact must form part of any responsible contractual negotiations. Further, for 
such plaintiffs, certainty is perhaps as important as justice. It is far easier to 
negotiate for protection with knowledge of the default rules. 
The point 1s that contractual relational economic loss plaintiffs are typically 
sophisticated insured parties suing a defendant who is already liable for the damage 
caused. What is needed is not so much a rule to punish, but a rule to allocate often 
unavoidable losses of day to day life. 
The most important factor, though, is that most plaintiffs cannot recover under any 
approach. The risk of indeterminate liability is simply far larger with contractual 
relational economic loss than it is with any other form of economic loss. Clear limits 
must be imposed. As Feldthusen points out: 124 
Every time there is injury to person or property, there will be an 
indeterminate number of persons whose immediate economic interests 
may be damaged. 
A rule generally precluding liability is simply sensible. The uruque features of 
contractual relational economic loss provide a good answer to claims that the 
exclusionary rule is unprincipled and expedient. The rule is harsh, but it is not 
unfair. 
3 Conclusion 
It is submitted that the special relevance of the indeterminacy problem to contractual 
relational economic loss is a challenge that the proximity test is unable to 
convincingly answer. As Bernstein puts it: 125 
124 Bruce Feldthusen "The Recovery of Pure Economic Loss in Canada: Proximity, Justice, Rationality, 
and Chaos" above n65 , 17. 
125 Bernstein Economic Loss above n8 , 178. See also John Fleming "Economic Loss in Canada" 
( 1993) I Tort L Rev 68, 74, who also reaches this conclusion. 
While it is easy to criticise the exclusionary rule ... it must be appreciated 
that, whichever other alternative theory, or test, is applied, recovery will 
still be denied to the vast majority of relational economic loss sufferers. 
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If not by a general prohibition with careful exceptions, how else should the courts 
separate some parties with contractual claims over property from all of the others 
without opening the floodgates? A broad case-by-case approach has not shown that 
it can pick out one claimant from another in a principled way. Why, for instance, 
should CNR recover but not the other railway companies? 
It is submitted that only a categorical approach both reacts to the indeterminacy issue 
and pinpoints relevant and limited grounds for recovery. The exclusionary rule is by 
no means perfect. However, so long as it is tempered by carefully formulated 
exceptions, it is still the most principled, certain, and efficient way of sorting the 
lucky few from the rest. 
C The Form of the Exclusionary Rule 
If the categorical approach and therefore the exclusionary rule is preferred, thought 
must be given to its precise shape. Appropriately drafted exceptions can ameliorate 
much of the rule's perceived injustice. It is submitted that these should be wider than 
in most current forms of the rule. 
Firstly, the rule should be subject to the two generally accepted exceptions for certain 
admiralty cases 126 and joint ventures. However the definition of joint venture should 
be wider than that that adopted by the Canadian Supreme Court. The court in Bow 
Valley held that the two oil drilling companies, Bow Valley and Husky, were not in a 
joint venture with BVH; the company they created to own the rig. The reason was 
given more fully in Norsk: a joint venture only arises where both parties own ( or at 
least operate and maintain) the damaged property. 127 Bow Valley and Husky did not 
have any property rights or obligations in respect of the rig. 
126 That is, general average cases: see above nn45 and 79. 
127 Norsk above n52, 332 per La Forest J. 
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It is submitted that, in this context at least, this definition is too narrow. Clearly if 
Bow Valley and Husky had shared between themselves ownership and management 
of the rig, they would have been in a joint venture. However instead of using the 
same entity to both own and use the rig, they cleanly split ownership and use. Their 
subsidiary company would own the rig, but they would use it. This is simply a 
different way of achieving the same practical result. It is submitted that a joint 
venture should not require joint property ownership but should also recognise 
structural control. That is, a joint venture should be found to exist between any 
company and a subsidiary in which the company is a controlling shareholder, where 
the latter owns the property which the former contractually uses. 
Thus if Bow Valley and Husky had held a controlling interest in BVH, this should 
have constituted a joint venture. In this situation there is still only one project - to 
use the rig to drill for oil. The difference is simply that instead of jointly owning the 
rig, the users would jointly own the owner of the rig . In the event, Bow Valley and 
Husky did not own BVH. At the time of the fire , neither (either separately or jointly) 
held more than half of the shares in the holding company which 100% owned 
BVH. 128 Nor did they have indirect control over this holding company. 
It is submitted that the result in the case was therefore correct. In the absence of a 
clear right to control BVH, Bow Valley and Husky' s interest was primarily a 
contractual right to use property belonging to a separate party. Although their 
intention to use the rig to drill for oil is clear, they did not express this intent through 
either the ownership of the rig, or their relationship with the rig's owner. Bow 
Valley and Husky carefully structured their relationship with BVH for tax purposes. 
They should not have the best of both worlds. If the corporate veil is firmly lowered 
for tax reasons, it should not be lifted in a tort context. It was open to Bow Valley 
and Husky to form a joint venture of some sort with BVH. They intentionally did 
not do this. 
128 BVH was actually 100% owned by BVHOH, which in turn was owned 34.96% by Husky and 
64.96% by BVRS, a subsidiary of Bow Valley. However, Bow Valley owned only 41.5% of BVRS. 
Thus BVRS and not Husky or Bow Valley, owned the majority of shares in BVHOH. As Bow Valley 
did not own more than half of the shares in BVRS, neither it nor Husky could command a controlling 
interest in BVHOH or, indirectly, BVH. See Bow Valley Newfoundland CA above n78, 15, 60. 
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Secondly, an exception should be made for transferred loss cases. Although this was 
rejected by the House of Lords in The Aliakmon, and not expressly accepted by the 
Supreme Court of Canada, it makes sense and is not problematic in the narrow 
definition given by La Forest J. Lord Goff s revival of this concept in the recent 
House of Lords case of White v Jones 129 concerning negligence affecting intended 
beneficiaries under a will adds impetus to this argument. Where the risk of property 
damage has been assigned to the plaintiff, the plaintiff has all the interest in suing 
and the owner has none. There is little problem of indeterminate liability and a real 
risk that the tortfeasor will be underdeterred as a result of not being made to pay for 
the property actually damaged. In other words, where property is damaged, someone 
should have both a right and an interest to sue for that damage. The transferred loss 
exception ensures this. 
Thirdly, a strong case could also be made for time charterers, whose exclusion even 
La Forest J admits appears "capricious". 130 In many respects contracts of carriage 
differ from contracts of hire and can be probably distinguished from the latter 
without creating unlimited liability. 131 Cargo carriers such as ships are almost 
always in use by someone and usually by only one party. Sometimes this party is the 
owner. Frequently it is not. However some loss of use will almost always result 
from the physical damage. This loss of use is thus routinely predictable. If a party 
damages a cargo ship, it should have to pay for the almost inevitable economic loss 
caused to the carrier - whoever this might be. 
Finally, the rule cannot be inflexible. There must be scope for further exceptions, 
although these must be made with care so as not to undermine the certainty of the 
rule. The essence of the test applied in Bow Valley, that an exception be made only 
when the negative policy considerations. that "usually preclude recovery of 
contractual relational economic loss ... are overridden" 132 seems appropriate. 
129 [1995] 2 AC 207, 264-266. 
130 Norsk above n52, 356. 
131 Michael Jones "Economic Loss - A Return to Pragmatism" [1986] 102 LQR 13, 17. Feldthusen 
appears to agree: Bruce Feldthusen Economic Negligence (led) above n9l, 247. 
132 Bow Valley above n53 , 409 . 
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Specifically, in accordance with La Forest J's suggestion in Norsk, the plaintiff 
should attempt to: 
a) address the indeterminacy problem; and 
b) either show that the deterrent effect of potential liability to the owners 
property is low; or 
c) show that the plaintiffs opportunity to allocate risk by contract is 
slight. 
If this can be done, then there would seem little objection towards carefully 
extending the ambit of the defendant's liability. 
V CONCLUSION 
The aim of this paper has been to show that the choice whether or not to adopt the 
exclusionary rule is a choice about how to control negligence law generally. This 
perennial problem is relevant to New Zealand as the case law is currently equivocal 
as to whether the exclusionary rule is still good law. Overseas jurisdictions, while 
not so equivocal, are not all in agreement. What all of the cases have shown though 
is that the issue over the exclusionary rule is, in reality, a choice about approach. 
Specifically, a choice between the broad, case-by-case test of proximity and the 
categorical approach dividing different types of economic damage into different 
groups. 
This paper has argued that the second is the most principled approach - the one 
which is most able to isolate meaningful reasons behind the outcomes it provides -
and that the adoption of this approach naturally leads to the acceptance of a general 
exclusionary rule for contractual relational economic loss. As La Forest J stated: 
"[t]he court should do more than simply establish a rule which allows judges to 
resolve cases as they see fit". 133 
133 Norsk above n52, 357. 
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This latter result is, in effect, the current New Zealand approach established by the 
Court of Appeal in Brown and South Pacific. If this approach is to be continued, the 
logical conclusion is for the exclusionary rule to be finally rejected. However this 
author respectfully submits that such a broad approach is not sophisticated enough to 
accommodate the complexities of modem negligence law. 
In any event, one thing is clear. If and when - possibly as a result of the Auckland 
power crisis - the issue of whether New Zealand should retain the exclusionary rule 
comes again for judicial consideration, the choice will be larger than it might appear. 
It will be whether to modernise negligence law by reference to clear principles, or to 
retain it as an unrefined tool of judicial policymaking. 
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